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PLEAS, PLAIN LANGUAGE AND
PRECEDENT: APPLICABILITY OF
RULES 11(F) AND 31(E) TO
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
PROVISIONS
United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Libretti,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the factual basis requirement of Rule 11 (f) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure does not apply to a forfeiture provision of a
guilty plea. In addition, the Court clarified the standard for what con-
stitutes an effective waiver of a defendant's Rule 31 (e) right to a spe-
cial jury verdict.2
This Note examines the purposes of Rules 11(f) and 31(e) and
the significant role that each plays in securing the rights of criminal
defendants during the pleading process. This Note further analyzes
the Court's holding regarding the applicability of both rules to a plea
agreement containing a forfeiture provision. This Note then argues
that the Court properly concluded that the plain language, prece-
dents and congressional intent show that neither Rule is applicable to
a forfeiture provision included in a plea agreement. However, by
summarily dismissing the defendant's claims that forfeiture requires a
heightened procedural standard, the Supreme Court failed to ade-
quately address the policy considerations behind forfeiture provisions
contained in plea agreements. 3
1 116 S. Ct. 356 (1995).
2 Id. at 368-69.
3 Forfeiture is the "government's uncompensated confiscation of property that is im-
plicated in a crime. The property may be used to commit the crime, be its product, or be
obtained by its fruits." LEONARD W. LEvi, A LICENSE To STEAL: THE FoRFErruRE OF PROP-
ERTY ix (1996). The government can only require a defendant to forfeit his or her prop-
erty if such forfeiture is authorized by statute. Arthur W. Leach & John G. Malcolm,
Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture Debate. 10 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
241 (1994). Criminal forfeiture statutes deter criminal activity in two important ways.
These statutes implement a form of monetary punishment for engaging in criminal activ-
ity. Id. at 250. In addition, they remove the financial base of criminal activity, thereby
eliminating funds that can be used to continue criminal activity. Id. An additional goal of
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II. BACKGROUND
A. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 (F)
Rule 11 (f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that "[n]otwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court
should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such
inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea."4 The
Federal Rules Committee enacted Rule 11 primarily to codify existing
common law on pleas of guilty, not guilty, and no/o contender5 and to
reiterate the court's duty to "ascertain that [a] plea of guilty is intelli-
gently and voluntarily made."6 Reiterating the original purpose of
Rule 11 to ensure that defendants' pleas are intelligent and voluntary,
the 1966 Amendment adopting section (f) provides general guide-
lines as to what measures a court should take in order to determine
the accuracy of a defendant's plea.7 Neither the Federal Rules Com-
mittee nor the Supreme Court has made any substantive changes to
Rule 11 (f) since its adoption through the 1966 Amendment.8
1. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Rule 11(t)
In Libretti, the Supreme Court interpreted the applicability of
Rule 11 (f) to a guilty plea containing a criminal forfeiture provision.9
However, in examining the applicability of Rule 11 (f) to guilty pleas
in general, the Supreme Court has emphasized the important role
that Rule 11 (f) plays in ensuring that defendants make knowing, vol-
untary and intelligent guilty pleas.' 0 Shortly after the 1966 Amend-
criminal forfeiture is to provide a source of funds, in the form of both money and prop-
erty, for law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., LEI, supra, at 1.
4 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (f).
5 See id. advisory committee's note ("This rule is substantially a restatement of existing
law and practice.").
6 Id. (citing Fogus v. United States, 34 P.2d 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944)).
7 FED. R CrM. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
The court should satisfy itself, by inquiry of the defendant or the attorney for the
government, or by examining the presentence report, or otherwise, that the conduct
which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or in-
formation or an offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.
8 The 1974 Amendment did, however, clarify the policy rationale behind Rule 11(f)
and took note of the fact that Rule 11 (f) fails to specify what type of inquiry is sufficient to
satisfy a court that a factual basis for the plea exists. The Amendment also offered several
suggestions as to what may constitute a sufficient inquiry, including "having the accused
describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge" and making an inquiry of the "defend-
ant, of the attorneys for the government and the defense, of the presentence report when
one is available, or by whatever means is appropriate in a specific case." FED. R. CRIM. P. 11
advisory committee's note (citing ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUIL'ry § 1.6 (Ap-
proved Draft, 1968)).
9 United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356, 362 (1995).
10 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) ("[A] plea of guilty is more
1997] 813
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ment to Rule 11, the Court examined Rule 11 in the context of a plea
agreement made by a defendant charged with tax evasion." Empha-
sizing the serious nature of a guilty plea, the Court explained that a
guilty plea is "an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal
charge" and by pleading guilty a defendant "waives several constitu-
tional rights."12 The Court further held that the consequences of a
trial court's failure to comply with provisions of Rule 11 were that the
reviewing court could set aside the plea, and remand the case in order
to provide the defendant with an opportunity to "plead anew."' 3
The Supreme Court has historically recognized the important
role that Rule 11 (f) plays in protecting the rights of criminal defend-
ants who plead guilty.14 Thus, the source of contention in Libretti is
determining what a court should consider as being part of a "plea of
guilty."' 5 The Court has construed a "plea of guilty" as containing two
components: the first component consists of "a defendant's admission
of guilt of a substantive criminal offense as charged in an indictment"
and the second includes a defendant's "waiver of the right to a jury
determination on that charge." 16 One of the disputed Rule 11(f) is-
sues that surfaced in Libretti is whether a defendant's stipulated forfei-
ture of assets contained in a guilty plea constitutes a "substantive
criminal offense" and whether it must be subjected to a factual basis
inquiry. 17 The Court in Libretti noted that its "precedents have ...
characterized criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment imposed
following conviction of a substantive criminal offense."18
2. The Split in the Circuits
Although Libretti presents the first occasion in which the Supreme
Court has interpreted Rule 11 (f) in the context of a forfeiture provi-
than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction;
nothing remains but to give judgment." Thus, a trial judge's acceptance of a guilty plea
"without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary" constitutes reversible
error.); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.10 (1970).
11 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 461 (1969).
12 Id. at 1171.
'3 Id. at 1172.
14 See, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (commenting on the importance of Rule 11 in ensuring that pleas are
voluntary and knowing).
15 United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356, 362-63 (1995).
16 Id. at 362 (citing Broce, 488 U.S. at 570); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243
(1969) (holding that by pleading guilty, defendant also waives constitutional privileges
against compulsory self-incrimination and the right to confront his or her accusers).
17 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 362-63.
18 Id. at 363 (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993) ("criminal forfei-
ture authorized by the RICO forfeiture statute 'is clearly a form of monetary punishment
•...'")).
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sion, several circuit courts previously considered the issue.' 9 Before
the Libretti decision, circuit courts were divided as to whether a forfei-
ture provision contained in a plea agreement fell within the ambit of
Rule 11 (f).20 The Court therefore granted certiorari primarily to re-
solve this dispute among the circuits.2 ' Circuit courts have focused on
a combination of policy arguments and statutory interpretations of
relevant criminal statutes in order to justify their jurisdictions' view on
the applicability of Rule 11 (f) to a forfeiture provision contained in a
plea agreement.
For example, in United States v. Roberts,22 the Seventh Circuit ex-
amined the accuracy of a defendant's plea of guilty to violations of the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).23
In Roberts, the defendant pled guilty to counts of mail fraud and RICO
violations.2 4 The plea agreement contained a provision requiring the
defendant to forfeit, inter alia, a $30,000 automobile presumably on
the basis that the defendant purchased the automobile with assets of
the illegal enterprise. 25 On appeal, the defendant argued that be-
cause the automobile was a personal asset and he paid most of the
19 See, e.g., United States v. Boamer, 966 F.2d 1575, 1581 (11th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Reckmeyer, 786 F.2d 1216, 1222 (4th Cir. 1986).
20 See Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 362 (discussing the split among the circuits).
21 Id.
22 749 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1984).
23 Id. at 406. RICO states, in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce .... (b) It shall be
unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in
or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce..
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962... shall be fined.., or imprisoned
... or both, and shall forfeit to the United States... (1) any interest the person has
acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962; (2) any- (A) interest in; (B)
security of, (C) claim against; or (D) property or contractual right of any kind afford-
ing a source of influence over, any enterprise which the person has established, oper-
ated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of. . .; and (3) any
property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, di-
rectly or indirectly, from racketeering activity ....
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994).
24 749 F.2d at 406.
25 Id. at 409. The defendant had paid $26,000 toward the purchase price of the auto-
mobile "before the time of any of the illegal activity mentioned in either the indictment or
the plea agreement." Id. However, the defendant paid the final amount of the purchase
price with a corporation check. Id. at 406. The court noted that the government did not
claim that the amount the defendant paid prior to the RICO violation was "derived from
the illegal activity." Id. at 409.
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purchase price before the RICO violations, "the automobile falls
outside the forfeiture provisions of the RICO statute."26 Citing Rule
11 (f), the court concluded that in determining the accuracy of a plea
agreement containing a forfeiture provision, the trial court has a "spe-
cial burden" to ensure that a factual basis for the plea exists.27 The
court emphasized that "[t] he mere fact that the defendant has agreed
that an item is forfeitable, in a plea agreement, does not make it so
.. 28 Thus, the court reasoned, "[a] defendant's waiver of his right
to trial cannot be said to have a factual basis, where a forfeiture of
property is involved, unless the property is in fact subject to forfeiture
. . . . [T]he trial court must satisfy itself that this condition is
satisfied."29
In addition, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Reckmeyer,30 also
concluded that Rule 11 (f) requires a trial court to ensure that a fac-
tual basis for forfeiture exists. 31 The court agreed with the Seventh
Circuit's position in Roberts that in order to comply with Rule 11 (f),
the court must base its decision to institute a forfeiture action on
something more than a defendant's mere agreement that assets are
forfeitable. 32 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit ultimately held that the
trial court record indicated that a factual basis existed for the forfei-
ture of the defendant's assets,33 and that evidence presented at trial
was sufficient to satisfy the Rule 11 (f) factual basis requirement 34
Finally, in United States v. Crumbley,35 the Eleventh Circuit "as-
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. The court nonetheless noted that a defendant "cannot be allowed to protect
assets by claiming that, although they were purchased with corporation funds, the assets
were really purchased for personal use." Id. at 410. Thus, the court concluded that based
on concessions made in the plea agreement, the automobile was forfeitable under RICO.
Id.
29 Id.
30 786 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1986).
31 Id. at 1222 (holding that the trial court should have determined whether a factual
basis existed for a plea agreement in which the defendant pled guilty to a Continuing
Criminal Enterprise count under 21 U.S.C. § 848 and agreed to forfeit drug related assets).
32 Id.
33 Id. Evidence presented to the trial court established that the defendant had "insig-
nificant legitimate income during the decade of his drug operations." Moreover, the in-
dictment exempted residential positions valued at less than $1,000, presumably because
the defendant could have purchased these items with legitimate income. In addition, the
defendant disputed neither the government's claims of his insignificant income, nor its
claims that drug related activities accounted for a significant portion of his income. The
court's focus on the defendant's failure to dispute the government's claims suggests the
defendant has an affirmative duty to contest the forfeiture provision at some point during
the proceeding. Id.
34 Id.
35 872 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1989).
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sum [ed] without deciding that Rule 11 (f) has some application to the
forfeiture part of a plea agreement."36 In Crumbey, the defendant
pled guilty to a state murder charge and federal charges of engaging
in a continuing criminal enterprise and filing a false tax return; he
thus agreed to forfeit certain assets under 21 U.S.C. § 853.37 In ex-
change, the state agreed not to seek the death penalty and the federal
prosecutor recommended dismissal of the federal counts.38 The gov-
ernment conceded that a forfeiture provision of a plea agreement "re-
quires proof of a factual basis for the forfeiture beyond a mere
consent to it in the agreement."39 Nonetheless, the court concluded
that neither Roberts nor Reckmeyer held that Rule 11 (f) "requires the
same level of proof of the factual basis for a forfeiture as with the
factual basis for guilt."40 Moreover, the court determined that the pol-
icy rationales requiring a court to determine a factual basis for guilt
are "far more compelling than those underlying the need of a factual
basis for property forfeiture."41 The court held that based on the evi-
dence in the record before the district court, the district court prop-
erly concluded that a factual basis existed for forfeiture of the
defendant's assets.42
Conversely, other circuit courts have held that Rule 11 (f) does
not require a trial court to determine whether a factual basis exists for
a defendant's guilty plea. In United States v. Bachynsky,43 the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that the Rule 11 (f) factual basis requirement does not
apply to a forfeiture provision of a guilty plea agreement.44 The de-
fendant in Bachynsky pled guilty to RICO and tax fraud counts and
agreed to forfeit certain assets. 45 The court held that in order to sat-
isfy the factual basis requirement of Rule 11 (f), a prosecutor must
"present evidence to the subjective satisfaction of the district court
which indicates that a defendant actually committed the offense to
which he is pleading guilty."'46 The court determined that the witness
testimony, the plea agreement, the indictment and statements by the
defendant satisfied this requirement.47 Although the court acknowl-
edged the holding in Reckmeyer that a defendant's agreement to forfei-
36 Id. at 976. The 11th Circuit subsequently rejected this view. See infra notes 50-56.
37 Id. For the text of the statute, see infra note 116.
38 Crumbey, 872 F.2d at 976.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 977.
42 Id.
43 949 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1991).
44 Id. at 730.
45 Id. at 723.




ture "does not make it so," the court emphasized the fact that a
"defendant's affirmative answers to the court's questions at the plea
hearing ... impose a 'heavy burden' to overcome."48 The court also
noted that the defendant neither objected to the forfeiture provision
at sentencing, nor provided evidence to contradict the government's
claim that all specifically listed assets were subject to forfeiture.49
In United States v. Boatner,50 the defendant pled guilty to distribut-
ing narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1)51 and entered into
a plea agreement whereby he forfeited $50,000 of assets pursuant to
21 U.S.C. §§ 853 (a) (1) and (2).52 The Eleventh Circuit rejected its
previous holding in Crumbley and decided that neither "Reckmeyer nor
Roberts is persuasive."53 The court reasoned that forfeiture is a "conse-
quence of a defendant's drug activity" and a "sanction to which the
parties agree as a result of the defendant's plea."54 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, forfeiture was not, as the Reckmeyer and Roberts deci-
sions claim, either "a determination of [the defendant's] culpability"
or "a plea to a substantive charge."55 Thus, concluded the court, Rule
11 (f) does not require a trial court to "determine whether there is a
factual basis for a defendant's concession to a criminal forfeiture pur-
suant to his plea bargaln with the government." 56
B. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 31(E)
Rule 31 (e) provides that "[i]f the indictment or the information
alleges that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a
special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or
property subject to forfeiture, if any."57 The Federal Rules Committee
adopted subdivision (e) in 1972 through an amendment to the origi-
nal 1944 version of Rule 31.58 The primary purpose of subdivision (e)
was to "provide procedural implementation" of the criminal forfeiture
48 Id. at 730-31.
49 Id.
50 966 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1992).
51 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) provides:
(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person know-
ingly or intentionally-(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or posses with in-
tent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance; or (2) to create,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit
substance.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994).
52 See statute cited infra note 116.




57 FED. R GiM. P. 31(e).
58 Id. advisory committee's note.
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provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 59
1. The Supreme Court's and Circuit Courts' Interpretations of Rule 31 (e)
As with Rule 11(f), circuit courts were previously divided as to
whether Rule 31(e) establishes a right to a jury determination of the
forfeitability of a defendant's assets.60 While circuit courts agreed that
a defendant can waive the right to have a jury determine what prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture, circuits disagreed as to the requisites for
waiver of that right and to the effects of an invalid waiver. 6'
For example, in United States v. Zang,62 the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered the adequacy of criminal defendants' waiver of the Rule 31(e)
special verdict right.63 In Zang, a jury convicted the defendants of
conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud and racketeering.64 The court
subsequently sentenced the defendants on each count and entered a
forfeiture order.65 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the defend-
ants' claim that they were "wrongfully denied a special verdict" pursu-
ant to Rule 31 (e).66 The court held that no "plain error" ensued by
the use of a general verdict at trial because the defendants "waive[d]
their right to a special verdict by not making a timely request."67
59 Id. The Advisory Committee notes that the "assumption of the draft is that the
amount of the interest or property subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the of-
fense to be alleged and proved." Id. (citing FED. R. CruM. P. 7(c) (2) advisory committee's
note). Rule 7(c) (2) states that "[n]o judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal
proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest
or property subject to forfeiture." FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (2). Rule 7(c) (2) was also adopted
by a 1972 Amendment in order to "provide procedural implementation" of forfeiture pro-
visions of the Organized Crime Control and Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Acts. Id. advisory committee's note. In addition, Rule 7(c) (2) incorporates the
notice element of the common law provision that a defendant in a criminal forfeiture
proceeding was "entitled to notice, trial, and a special jury finding on the factual issues
surrounding the declaration of forfeiture which followed his criminal conviction." Id.
60 See United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356, 862 (1995) (discussing the dispute among
the circuits).
61 Compare United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 1982) ("parties can
waive their right to a special verdict by not making a timely request") with United States v.
Robinson, 8 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a defendant's waiver of the Rule
31(e) right is valid only if "knowingly and voluntarily made").
62 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982).
63 Id. at 1194-95.
64 Id. at 1189.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1194.
67 Id. At trial, the defendants failed to make objections when the court asked the par-
ties to review the jury verdict form. After the jury had begun deliberations, defendants
brought the special verdict provision to the court's attention. When the court offered to
communicate the special verdict procedures to the jury during deliberation, defendants
objected on the grounds that bringing the special verdict to the jury's attention during
1997]
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In United States v. Garrett,68 however, the Eleventh Circuit deter-
mined that a defendant has a constitutional right to ajury determina-
tion as to whether particular property is forfeitable. 69 Consequently, a
defendant must specifically waive that right in writing.70 In Garrett,
the trial court ordered that the defendant forfeit certain assets derived
from the defendant's illegal narcotics activity.7 1 In response, defense
counsel stated that he did not object to the judge resolving the issue
of forfeiture after the jury returned a verdict on the issue of guilt.7 2
On appeal, defendant claimed that ajury determination as to whether
particular assets are forfeitable can only be waived by a defendant's
written statement of waiver, not by counsel's oral statement.73
Finally, in United States v. Libretti,74 the Tenth Circuit analyzed
Rule 31 (e) in the context of a case where a defendant pled guilty to
violating provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 848. 75 The court here stated that
the "defendant has the burden of proving that he did not exercise a
valid waiver of his right."76 The court held that the defendant failed
to meet that burden since the plea agreement was "unambiguous" and
the defendant's plea was "knowing and voluntary."77 Moreover, the
defendant failed to show that he wanted ajury trial on the forfeiture
issue.78 This failure, coupled with the fact that the language of the
plea agreement "waived the right to ajury trial without specific men-
deliberations "would bring undue emphasis" on the count that invoked the forfeiture pro-
vision, thereby causing "reversible error and prejudic[e]." Id.
68 727 F.2d 1003 (11th Cir. 1984).
69 Id. at 1012.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1007.
73 Id. at 1012.
74 38 F.3d 523 (10th Cir. 1994).
75 Id. at 525. 21 U.S.C. § 848 ("Continuing criminal enterprise") provides, in pertinent
part:
(a) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and which may be up to
life imprisonment, to a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accord-
ance with the provisions of Tite 18, or $2,000,000 if the defendant is an individual...
and to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this title ... (c) For purposes of
subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise
if-(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the
punishment for which is a felony, and (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series
of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter-(A) which are under-
taken by such person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom
such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other posi-
tion of management, and (B) from which such person obtains substantial income or
resources.
21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
76 Libretti, 38 F.3d at 530.




tion of forfeiture," constituted a valid waiver of the defendant's Rule
31 (e) special verdict right.79
2. The Sixth Amendment and Rule 31(e)
In broad terms, the Sixth Amendment provides criminal defend-
ants with a right to trial by jury.8 0 Recently, in United States v.
Gaudin,81 the Supreme Court reiterated the important role that the
Sixth Amendment plays in protecting the rights of criminal defend-
ants.82 In Gaudin, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment provides
a defendant with a constitutional right to demand a jury determina-
tion of his or her guilt or innocence with regard to elements of a
crime.83 Despite the importance of the Sixth Amendment, the Court
has nonetheless recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial has certain limitations. Specifically, the Sixth Amendment does
not afford a criminal defendant with the right to ajury determination
of the appropriateness of a sentence imposed subsequent to such a
determination. 84
The Rule 31 (e) special verdict requirement applies specifically to
criminal forfeiture.8 5 Since the Court in Libretti determined that for-
feiture is a part of the sentence, not part of the substantive offense,
the Rule 31 (e) special verdict right is not equivalent to a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of guilt.86
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 22, 1992, a grand jury indicted defendant Joseph V. Li-
'79 Id.
80 The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
81 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995).
82 Id. at 2314 (stating that the Sixth Amendment "gives a criminal defendant the right
to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is
charged").
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) ("[T]here is no Sixth
Amendment right tojury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of
fact.").
85 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(e).
86 United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356, 368 (1995). But see FED. R. CiuM. P. 31
advisory committee note ("The assumption of the draft is that the amount of the interest
or property subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the offense to be alleged and
proved.").
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bretti, Jr. on eleven counts of violating federal firearms, drug and
money laundering laws.87 The multicount indictment also alleged
that Libretti operated a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE).88 The
alleged CCE was a cocaine and marijuana distribution organization
that the defendant operated in Wyoming and Colorado from 1984 to
199289 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.90 Libretti's trial began on Sep-
tember 28, 1992.9' During Libretti's one week trial, the Government
called eighteen witnesses to establish the defendant's involvement in
the possession and distribution of narcotics. 92 Nine witnesses testified
that they had purchased cocaine from the defendant.93 Five witnesses
were drug dealers who testified that the defendant supplied them with
narcotics and advised and assisted their operations while he was living
in Colorado and Wyoming.94 In addition, the government presented
evidence that Libretti purchased a home, automobile and numerous
weapons95 during a period when the court determined Libretti's an-
nual income was between $20,000 to $50,000.96
After one week of trial, Libretti entered into a plea agreement
whereby he pled guilty to the CCE count and agreed to specific forfei-
ture provisions detailed in three paragraphs of the plea agreement. 97
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the plea agreement, Libretti agreed to the
"forfeiture of all known assets as prescribed in 21 U.S.C. § 853 and
87 Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356 (1995) (No. 94-
7427). The 11 counts were conspiring to possess cocaine and marijuana with intent to
distribute (Count 1); using or carrying firearms and silencers during and in relation to a
drug trafficking felony (Count 2); traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate drug traf-
ficking (Count 3); unlawful possession of a machine gun (Count 4); investment of illegal
drug proceeds in a business (Count 5); money laundering (Counts 7 and 8); obstruction of
justice (Counts 9 and 10); and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (Count 11).
88 Id. Operating a CCE (Count 6). Count 6 required Libretti to forfeit "all property of
any kind constituting or derived from proceeds" obtained from the CCE and "'all property
of any kind' used or intended for use to facilitate the enterprise." Id. at 2-3.
89 Id.
90 Id. See statute cited supra note 75.





95 Id. at 5. Libretti purchased a $200,000 home with a $100,000 down payment; an
automobile with a $19,000 check; and $243,000 worth of automatic and semi-automatic
weapons. Id.
96 Id. at 8. The Presentence Report (PSR) indicated that the following sources consti-
tuted Libretti's legitimate income: $20,000 per year as a restaurant and grocery store man-
ager (1985 to 1986); commission-only income as a stockbroker and income as a thrift store
manager (1987); involvement in a real estate transaction that resulted in a loss (1988);
$50,000 operating a firearms business (1989); various legitimate activities resulting in ap-
proximate annual income of $40,000 (1989 to 1991).
97 United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356, 360 (1995).
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assets which are discovered at any later time up to $1,500,000."98 In
addition to the forfeiture penalty, Paragraph 2 also described addi-
tional maximum statutory penalties for the offense, which included
"life imprisonment, not more than a $2,000,000 fine, or both, and a
$50 mandatory special assessment."9 9 Under Paragraph 9 of the plea
agreement, Libretti also agreed to "identify all assets that were used to
facilitate his criminal activity" and to "provide complete financial dis-
closure forms requiring the listing of assets and financial interests." 100
Paragraph 10 of the plea agreement required Libretti to agree to the
following:
transfer his right, title, and interest in all of his assets to the Division of
Criminal Investigation of the Wyoming Attorney General iricluding, but
not limited to: all real estate; all personal property, including guns, the
computer, and every other item now in the possession of the United
States; all bank accounts, investments, retirement accounts, cash, cash-
ier's checks, travelers checks [sic] and funds of any kind 10
Finally, as part of the plea agreement, Libretti acknowledged "that by
pleading guilty to Count 6 of the Indictment, he waive[d] various con-
stitutional rights, including the right to ajury trial."102 In return for
Libretti's guilty plea and asset forfeiture, the Government recom-
mended the mandatory minimum sentence for a CCE conviction,
twenty years imprisonment, and agreed not to pursue other criminal
charges against him.10 3
Following the plea agreement, the district court held a hearing
during which the judge advised Libretti of his rights, including his
right to ajury trial, "clarified the consequences of Libretti's plea," and
further questioned Libretti to ensure that his plea was voluntary and
factually based.' 0 4 In response to the district judge's comments and
clarifications at the hearing, Libretti questioned only the provision in
Paragraph 2 of the plea agreement involving the future forfeiture of
assets up to $1,500,000.105 The districtjudge assured Libretti that the
future forfeiture provision applied only to subsequently discovered
98 Id.
99 Petitioner's Brief at 3, Libretti (No. 94-7427).
100 Id. at 3-4.
101 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 360.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 361.
105 Respondent's Brief at 6, Libretti (No. 94-7427). In response to the question of
whether he understood the consequences of the plea agreement, Libretti stated, "There is
only one part I didn't understand. They said that they can take up to one and a half
million dollars from me at any time. Let's say 20 years from now I get a job, I get a
paycheck. They can come and take that?" Id.
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drug-tainted assets, not legitimate income. 10 6
Prior to the sentencing hearing, the Government prepared a
Prosecutor's Statement detailing Libretti's illegal activities and
describing assets that Libretti purchased with proceeds from such ac-
tivities. 10 7 The Prosecutor's Statement concluded that because Li-
bretti used illegal proceeds to purchase these assets, these assets were
forfeitable. 10 8 Following review of this information, the district court
sentenced Libretti to twenty years imprisonment and five years of su-
pervised release.109 The court also imposed a $5,000 fine, a
mandatory $50 assessment and 500 hours of community service." t0 At
the conclusion of the hearing, Libretti objected to what he considered
"a failure to find any factual basis for the whole forfeiture.""' In spite
of Libretti's objection, the district court entered a forfeiture order for
specific assets. 1 2 Shortly thereafter, Libretti filed an appeal from the
forfeiture order. 1 3 While pending on appeal, the district court modi-
fied the forfeiture order to return certain property to third-party
claimants, and to include a statement that "it may be unjust to enforce
the specific forfeiture provisions in the plea agreement."' 14
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected Libretti's challenges to the
forfeiture and affirmed the district court's forfeiture order.115 The
court of appeals determined that criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C.
§ 853116 is part of the sentence, not part of the substantive offense."17
106 Id.
107 Id. at 8 n.3.
108 Id. Purchases described in the Prosecutor's Statement included a $72,000 home in
Colorado, a $20,000 mortgage certificate, $243,000 worth of firearms, cashier's checks,
automobiles, real property, and other investments. The Statement also claimed that Li-
bretti earned and stored hundreds of thousands of dollars in safety deposit boxes, storage
lockers and bank accounts of relatives. The government estimated Libretti's drug profits
to be over $1,000,000. Id.






115 United States v. Libretti, 38 F.3d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1994).
116 21 U.S.C. § 853, "Criminal forfeitures," provides, in relevant part:
(a) Property subject to criminal forfeiture
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chap-
ter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United
States... (1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person
obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; (2) any of the per-
son's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, -such violation; and (3) in the case of a person con-
victed of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of section 848 of
this tile, the person shall forfeit, in addition to any property described in paragraph
(1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and property or contractual rights
affording a source of control over, the continuing criminal enterprise....
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Moreover, the court of appeals explained that the district court took
adequate measures to ensure that Libretti's guilty plea was both volun-
tary and factually based. 1 , Finally, the court rejected Libretti's argu-
ment that "he was not advised of and did not waive his right to ajury
trial on forfeiture issues.!" 19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 20 on March
27, 1995 to "resolve disagreement among the Circuits as to the appli-
cability of Rule 11 (f) to asset forfeiture provisions contained in plea
agreements and the requisites for waiver of the right to ajury determi-
nation of forfeitability under Rule 31 (e)."121
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,122 Justice O'Connor affirmed the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeal's decision and held that Rule 11 (f) does not
require a district court to determine whether a factual basis exists for a
stipulated forfeiture of assets in a plea agreement. 2 Moreover, Jus-
tice O'Connor argued that Libretti adequately waived his Rule 31 (e)
right to a jury determination of the forfeiture of his assets.124
In Part II-A of the opinion, the Court identified the role that Rule
11 (f) plays in the judicial process. Specifically, in analyzing Rule
11 (f), Justice O'Connor clarified the fact that "[b]y its plain terms, the
Rule applies only to a 'plea of guilty. '" 2 5 Citing well-established
Supreme Court precedent, Justice O'Connor defined a guilty plea as a
"defendant's admission of guilt of a substantive criminal offense as
charged in an indictment and his waiver of the right to ajury determi-
nation on that charge."126 Conversely, Justice O'Connor defined for-
feiture as "an element of the sentence imposed following... a plea of
21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994).
117 Libretti, 38 F.3d at 528.
118 Id. at 529.
"9 Id. at 530.
120 United States v. Libretti, 115 S. Ct. 1398 (1995).
121 United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356, 362 (1995).
122 ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Kennedy and Breyerjoined in all parts of the
opinion. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in parts I, 11-A, III and IV of the opinion. Both
Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred in thejudgment and Parts I, II-A, II-B and 11-C of
the majority opinion.
123 Discussed in Parts 11-A, 11-B and 1-C of the majority opinion.
124 Discussed in Part III of the majority opinion.
125 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 362.
126 Id. (citing, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989) ("'By entering a plea
of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts described in the




guilty."127 Thus, in essence, forfeiture is analogous to any other type
of sentence handed down as punishment for a crime. 128 Conse-
quently, Justice O'Connor distinguished a guilty plea from a forfeiture
provision and reasoned that by definition a forfeiture provision in a
plea agreement "falls outside the scope of Rule 11 (f).,,129 In addition
to well-established Supreme Court precedents, the Court cited con-
gressional intent °30 as well as the plain language' 31 and legislative his-
tory13 2 of specific criminal statutes as further evidence of the fact that
forfeiture is a punishment and/or sentence, not a "separate substan-
tive offense.' 33
In Part II-B, the Court briefly reviewed and quickly rejected Li-
bretti's policy arguments that Rule 11 (f) is necessary to ensure that a
defendant's forfeiture is knowing and voluntary, to protect defendants
against government overreaching and to protect the rights of third-
party claimants. 134 While the Court acknowledged that the purpose of
Rule 11 (f) is to ensure the voluntariness of a guilty plea, 135 the Court
once again reiterated the important distinction between a guilty plea
and a forfeiture provision.' 36 Moreover, the Court reasoned that the
"relevant inquiry" concerning the voluntariness of a defendant's con-
cession to a sentence is whether the defendant was informed or co-
erced into stipulating to the sentence, not whether the sentence is
"factually sound."' 3 7
The majority found Libretti's second policy argument "equally
unavailing."' 38 The majority reasoned that 21 U.S.C. § 853 inherently
prevents government overreaching by requiring the government to
prove that the defendant used "drug-tainted" funds to obtain the for-
127 Id. at 363.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. ("Congress conceived of forfeiture as punishment for the commission of various
drug and racketeering crimes.").
131 Id. ("A person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise 'shall be
sentenced.., to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853.'" (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 848(a));
("Forfeiture is imposed 'in addition to any other sentence.'" (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(a))).
132 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 193 (1983) (legislative history of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984) ("criminal forfeiture 'is imposed as a sanction against the
defendant upon his conviction'")).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 364.
135 Id. (Rule 11 is "designed to facilitate a more accurate determination of the voluntari-






feited assets. 139 While the majority recognized that since such forfeit-
ures provide revenue to the government-the government may have
an interest in encouraging forfeitures-the Court nonetheless deter-
mined that lower courts are well equipped to handle cases involving
potential governmental abuse.140 Moreover, additional procedural
safeguards, such as the revised Department of Justice instructions,
limit governmental abuse and protect the interests of criminal defend-
ants. 141 For example, pursuant to the Department of Justice guide-
lines, the forfeiture agreement "must be in writing and the defendant
himself must concede facts supporting the forfeiture" in order to en-
sure the validity of the forfeiture agreement. 142 The Court similarly
dismissed Libretti's final policy argument that Rule 11 (f) is necessary
to protect the rights of third-party claimants whose assets are included
in a forfeiture provision. 143 The Court stated that 21 U.S.C. § 853(n),
not Rule 11 (f), is the proper "means by which third-party rights must
be vindicated." 144
In Part I-C, the final section of Justice O'Connor's opinion on
the forfeiture issue, the Court reasoned that "the District Court did
not rest its forfeiture order on nothing more than Libretti's stipula-
tion that certain assets were forfeitable."145 The Court concluded that
the witness testimony, Presentence Report (PSR) and Prosecutor's
Statement were adequate bases for the district court to determine the
validity of the forfeiture provision. 146 Moreover, the indictment itself
specified which of Libretti's personal property and financial assets
would be subject to forfeiture.147 The district court judge heard sub-
stantial witness testimony that helped establish Libretti's involvement
in numerous drug transactions and provided further proof of Li-
bretti's financial assets and propdrty. 148 In addition, the district court
partially based its decision on the PSR, which summarized Libretti's
legitimate annual income from 1985 to 1991 and indicated that this
legitimate income was insufficient to pay for all of Libretti's assets and
investments. 149
139 Id.
140 Id. at 365 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 634
(1989)).
141 Id.
142 Id. (quoting U.S. DEI"T. OFJUsICE, RErISiD POLICY RFGARDING FORFEITUR" 1Yw STrLE-




146 Id. at 365-66.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 366.
149 Id. at 366-67.
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Finally, in Part III of the Court's opinion, Justice O'Connor ad-
dressed the adequacy of Libretti's waiver of the Rule 31 (e) jury deter-
mination of the forfeitability of his property.150 The Court held that
Libretti's voluntary and factually based plea agreement, coupled with
the plea colloquy, constituted a waiver of "Libretti's right to insist on
a jury determination of forfeitability under Rule 31(e)."151 Despite
Libretti's claims to the contrary, the Court determined that there is
neither a requirement that the plea agreement specifically reference
Rule 31 (e), nor a requirement that the court "specifically advise a de-
fendant that a plea of guilty will result in waiver of the Rule 31(e)
right."152 To reach this conclusion, Justice O'Connor relied primarily
on the Rule 11 (c) requirements regarding the information the court
must communicate to a defendant in order to ensure the validity of a
guilty plea. 5 3 Since Rule 31(e) is not specifically mentioned in the
Rule 11 (c) information requirements, the Court concluded that dis-
trict courts are not required to specifically address Rule 31 (e) in the
plea colloquy.' 54
Similarly, Justice O'Connor rejected Libretti's argument that the
Rule 31 (e) right to ajury determination of forfeitability has a constitu-
tional basis in the Sixth Amendment right to ajury determination of a
defendant's guilt or innocence. 155 In analyzing Libretti's challenge to
the constitutionality of his plea agreement, the Court distinguished
Rule 31 (e) 's jury trial right from that of the Sixth Amendment by reit-
erating the fact that forfeiture is part of the sentence. 156 Consistent
with established case law, the majority explained that a defendant
does not have a "constitutional right to ajury determination as to the
appropriate sentence to be imposed."157 Thus, by not having the for-
feiture provision of the plea agreement reviewed and/or approved by
a jury, Libretti suffered neither a constitutional nor a statutory depri-
vation of his rights. 15 8
Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that Libretti clearly indicated
that he "fully understood the nature and consequences of his guilty
plea and was prepared to be sentenced in accordance with the plea
agreement." 5 9 Moreover, neither Libretti nor his attorney objected
150 Id. at 367.
151 Id. at 369.
152 Id. at 368.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 367.
156 Id. at 367-68.





to the lack of ajury determination of the forfeiture provision. 160 Jus-
tice O'Connor noted the district court's basic responsibility of provid-
ing advice mandated by Rule 11 (c) and ensuring that the defendant is
not misled or confused about the provisions of the forfeiture agree-
ment.161 She concluded that the defendant's attorney, not the court,
should provide any information above and beyond these
requirements. 162
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
While agreeing with the majority that Rule II (f) was inapplicable
to a forfeiture provision embodied in a plea agreement, Justice Souter
wrote a separate, concurring opinion to discuss the Rule 31 (e) right
to a jury determination of forfeiture of assets.' 63 Justice Souter sug-
gested that the majority opinion went too far in determining whether
the Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial requires a court to inform a
defendant of any and all jury trial rights he or she may have.' 64 Such a
determination was unnecessary, argued Justice Souter, due to the
Rule 11 (c) information requirement imposed on the district court.165
This requirement, coupled with the fact that the defendant had an
ample opportunity to read and review the indictment, constituted suf-
ficient notice of the defendant's right to a jury determination of
forfeiture.1 66
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg also wrote separately due to the majority's han-
dling of the Rule 31(e) jury trial issue.' 67 Justice Ginsburg argued
that the right to ajury trial afforded by the Sixth Amendment is not
analogous to the "unusual jury-trial right on criminal forfeiture pro-
vided by Rule 31 (e)."168 Consequently, "waiver of the extraordinary
jury-trial right on forfeiture should turn on the defendant's awareness
of the right his plea will override." 169 Justice Ginsburg argued that
this level of "awareness" required a district court to do something




163 Id. at 369 (Souter, J., concurring).
164 Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
165 Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
166 Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
167 Id. at 369-70 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 370 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
169 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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forfeiture clause in the indictment."170 Justice Ginsburg assured dis-
trict courts that they can "easily achieve" such "clarity" by "routinely
apprising defendants, at plea hearings, of Rule 31 (e)'s atypical special-
verdict requirement. " 171 Therefore, applying this standard to Li-
bretti's case, Justice Ginsburg determined that Libretti was "carefully
and comprehensively informed" of the Rule 31(e) waiver by the
court's discussion of the special-verdict form and during voir dire.' 72
Thus, Justice Ginsburg concluded that Libretti could not claim "igno-
rance" of the special jury-trial rights afforded by Rule 31 (e). 1 7 -
D. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenting member of the Court,' 74 criti-
cized the majority for failing to "emphasize the underlying proposi-
tion that the law-rather than any agreement between the parties-
defines the limits on the district court's authority to forfeit a defend-
ant's property."1 75 Justice Stevens emphasized that the law, not Rule
11 (f), places a "legal obligation" on the district court "to determine
that there is a factual basis for the judgment entered upon a guilty
plea."' 76 Since Rule 11(f) provides a procedural, not a substantive,
right to protect a defendant's right to receive a legally sanctioned sen-
tence, "pre-existing substantive limits" placed on courts ensure that
guilty pleas are factually based. 177 Finally, Justice Stevens observed
that the "record does not provide a factual basis"1 78 for the "sweeping
forfeiture" 179 of defendant's property authorized by the district
court. 180
V. ANALYSIS
At first glance, the Court's holding that Rule 11 (f) does not apply
to a forfeiture provision of a guilty plea appears rather straightfor-
ward. The plain language of Rule 11(f) refers only to a "plea of
170 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
171 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
172 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
173 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
174 Id. at 370-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although dissenting, Justice Stevens expressed
his agreement with the majority's conclusion that Rule 11 (f) does not require a court to
determine the existence of a factual basis for forfeiture.
175 Id. at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Here, Justice Stevens referred to a bank account the
defendant opened as a child and the fact that the prosecutor could not classify all of Li-
bretti's assets as "substitute assets."
830 [Vol. 87
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
guilty."'" Moreover, the Court's review and analysis of its precedents
interpreting forfeiture provisions in general, and circuit court prece-
dents interpreting Rule 11 (f)'s applicability to forfeiture provisions in
particular suggest that Rule 11 (f) applies only to guilty pleas.
However, upon a more in-depth analysis, certain aspects of the
majority's decision in Libretti become subject to criticism. The Court's
lengthy discussion explaining that a factual basis existed for the de-
fendant's forfeiture in the case sub judice, coupled with the policy ra-
tionale behind both Rule 11(f) and statutorily prescribed criminal
forfeiture, suggests that there is more to the Court's decision than is
first apparent.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court properly concluded
that the plain language of Rule 11 (f) and precedent defining criminal
forfeiture as a sentence and/or punishment show that Rule 11 (f) does
not require a trial court to determine whether a factual basis exists for
a forfeiture provision. However, the Court did not properly address
the special nature of a defendant's rights involved in criminal forfei-
ture and the special jury trial right provided by Rule 31 (e).
A. THE SUPREME COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT RULE I1(F) DOES
NOT REQUIRE A TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER A
FACTUAL BASIS EXISTS FOR A GUILTY PLEA
Based on the plain language, Congressional intent and Supreme
Court and circuit court precedents interpreting Rule 11 (f) and crimi-
nal forfeiture, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that Rule 11 (f)
does not apply to a forfeiture provision included in a plea agree-
ment. 8 2 General rules of statutory construction require a court to
consider the plain language of a statute in interpreting whether the
statute applies to a particular case.'83 By its plain language, Rule 11 (f)
applies only to "a plea of guilty. 1 84 In past cases, 18 5 the Supreme
181 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f).
182 All members of the Court, including Justice Stevens, agreed that Rule 11(f) on its
face does not require a court to determine the existence of a factual basis. See id. at 370
(Stevens,J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority's conclusion that Rule 11(f) "does not cre-
ate a duty to determine that there is a factual basis for a forfeiture of assets").
183 See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) ("In a statutory
construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a
statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but
the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.") (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498
U.S. 184, 190 (1991)).
184 FED. R. CRIM. P. II(f).
185 In an apparent break from tradition, the Court in Caplin & Dysdae, Chartered v.
United States held that "forfeiture is a substantive charge in the indictment against defend-
ant." 491 U.S. 617, 628 n.5 (1989). In an attempt to reconcile this apparently contradic-
tory holding with that of Libretti, the Court distinguished Caplin on the grounds that the
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Court has defined a guilty plea as a defendant's admission of guilt of a
substantive criminal offense.' 8 6 Thus, technically a defendant forfeits
property only after a court or jury determines that a defendant is
guilty, or in the alternative, after a defendant pleads guilty to a sub-
stantive criminal offense.18 7 Similarly, the Continuing Criminal Enter-
prise statute, which provided the basis for Count 6 of the indictment
and to which Libretti pled guilty, also clearly indicates that Congress
intended for forfeiture to be a punishment and sentence for individu-
als who engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. 88 Indeed, the
circuit court and the Supreme Court noted that the defendant himself
stipulated that criminal forfeiture "is a part of the sentence, not a part
of the substantive offense." 189 Since "forfeiture is an element of the
sentence imposed following a plea of guilty," not an admission of
guilt, the Supreme Court properly concluded that forfeiture "falls
outside of Rule 11 (f)'s scope." 190
Justice O'Connor's classification of forfeiture as a sentence and/
or punishment is also consistent with the "weighty authority"'9 ' of leg-
islative history and Supreme and circuit court precedents. 192 Indeed,
Congress enacted forfeiture provisions in order to serve as a form of
monetary punishment. 93
defendant's claim was an invalid attempt to "escape an otherwise appropriate forfeiture
sanction by pointing to his need for counsel to represent him on the underlying charges."
Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 363. The Court then quickly noted that in other sections of the case, it
recognized that forfeiture was a criminal sanction imposed as a sentence, not a substantive
charge. Id.
186 See, e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989).
187 The criminal forfeiture statute at issue in Libretti states that a defendant's property
may be forfeited only after the defendant is "convicted" of the proscribed act. 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(a) (1994).
188 "Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced.., to
the forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this title..." 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1994) (empha-
sis added).
189 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 363; Libretti, 38 F.3d at 528.
190 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 363.
191 Id. at 364.
192 See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1993) (stating that crimi-
nal forfeiture authorized by RICO is a form of punishment); Wood v. United States, 863
F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that in the civil forfeiture context the "[f]orfeiture
cannot seriously be considered anything other than an economic penalty for drug traffick-
ing .... [T]he forfeiture provision was designed to reach drug traffickers where it hurts
the most . . . and to augment the traditional criminal sanctions of fines and
imprisonment.").
193 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 193 (1983) (stating that criminal forfeiture "is imposed as a
sanction against the defendant upon his conviction"); Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558-59.
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B. THE COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE POLICY RATIONALE
AND UNIQUE NATURE OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
The majority's decision in Libretti is based primarily on a technical
examination of the plain language of Rule 11 (f) and forfeiture as de-
fined and analyzed in past Supreme. Court opinions, circuit court
cases and criminal statutes. 94 However, by taking such a textual195
approach to defining criminal forfeiture, the Court ignores the im-
portant procedural safeguards established for defendants in criminal
forfeiture cases.' 96
In an attempt to reject a textual approach that strictly categorizes
forfeiture as either a substantive charge or a punishment, the defend-
ant argued that criminal forfeiture is in essence "a hybrid that shares
elements of both." 97 In support of this argument, the defendant
noted that Rules 7(c) (2), 198 31(e) 199 and 32(d) (2)200 "establish the
procedural framework for criminal forfeiture.., and reflect a deci-
sion to treat forfeiture as a substantive charge or element of criminal
liability, not merely as a matter of sentencing."20 1 Libretti argued that
these three Rules read together provide "heightened procedural safe-
guards for criminal forfeiture."20 2 Thus, Rule 11 (f), the only other
provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that addresses
criminal forfeiture, also provides a "heightened procedural safeguard
for criminal forfeiture."203
194 See Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 363.
195 Some commentators have suggested that while plain language is important in a
courts interpretation of a statute, courts should not take a purely linguistic approach to
interpreting a statute. See, e.g., Christina Egan, Level of Scienter Required for Child Pornography
Distributors: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of "Knowingly" in 18 U.S.C. § 2252, 86J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1369 (1996).
196 The defendant argued that "procedural safeguards are 'of particular importance' in
the forfeiture context because of the government's 'direct pecuniary interest in the out-
come of the proceeding.'" Brief for the Petitioner at 27, Libretti (No. 94-7427) (quoting
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 502 (1993)).
197 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 363.
198 FED. R. CPiM. P. 7(c) (2) ("[n]ojudgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal
proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest
or property subject to forfeiture").
199 FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e) ("[i]f the indictment or the information alleges that an inter-
est or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the
nature of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any").
200 FED. L CitM. P. 32(d) (2) ("[w]hen a verdict contains a finding of criminal forfei-
ture, the judgment must authorize the Attorney General to seize the interest or property
subject to forfeiture on terms that the court considers proper").
201 Petitioner's Brief at 11, Libretti (No. 94-7427).
202 Id. Indeed, even the majority recognized that the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure "attach heightened procedural protections to imposition of criminal forfeiture as
punishment for certain types of criminal conduct." Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 364.
203 Petitioner's Brief at 11, Libretti (No. 94-7427). As the defendant points out, rules
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The defendant also offered three policy arguments in support of
his contention that Rule 11 (f) applies to criminal forfeiture provisions
of a plea agreement.20 4 Despite the majority's claim to the contrary,
each of these policy arguments has merit when considered in the con-
text of the policy rationale behind Rule 11 (f) and the procedural safe-
guards afforded to criminal defendants.
The defendant's strongest argument is that Rule 11(f)'s factual
basis inquiry is "essential to ensuring that a forfeiture agreement is
knowing and voluntary."20 5 In responding to the defendant's claim,
Justice O'Connor reiterated her previous conclusion that forfeiture is
a part of the sentence.20 6 She also argued that the "relevant inquiry" a
court must make is to ensure that the defendant's stipulation to a par-
ticular sentence, i.e. forfeiture, is "informed and uncoerced." 20 7 The
court is not required to determine whether the sentence is "factually
sound."20  Although Justice O'Connor does not cite any authority
here, her argument apparently hinges on the structure of Rule 11.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure addresses two
specific characterizations of pleas that are implicated in Libretti: a
guilty plea209 and the plea agreement procedure.210 The guilty plea
7(c)(2), 11(f), 31(e) and 32(d)(2) are the only rules that specifically address the proce-
dural requirements for criminal forfeiture. Id. Considering the rule of statutory construc-
tion that statutes in pari materia "should be read, construed and applied together," the
defendant's framework argument has merit. See BLAcK's LAw DicrIoNARY 791 (6th ed.
1990). However, the majority's implicit rejection of an in pari materia argument may stem
from the fact that the canon only applies if the statute is ambiguous. AsJustice O'Connor
states throughout her opinion, Rule 11 (f) does not apply to forfeiture. Nonetheless, the
defendant's argument that the Court should construe these rules together is the better
reasoned one. For example, in rejecting the defendant's claim, the majority rebuts only
the defendant's argument that the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 31(e) assumes that
"the amount of interest or property subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the
offense to be alleged and proved." FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e) advisory committee's note. How-
ever, the defendant actually argued that all three rules, read together, shed light on the
proper interpretation of the applicability of the Rule 11(f) factual basis requirement to
forfeiture provisions contained in plea agreements. See Petitioner's Brief at 11, Libretti (No.
94-7427).





209 Rule 11 establishes the following procedural safeguards for defendants who offer
guilty pleas. Before accepting the guilty plea,
the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the de-
fendant of, and determine that the defendant understands the following: (1) the na-
ture of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty
provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law, including
the effect of any special parole or supervised release term, the fact that the court is
required to consider any applicable sentencing guidelines but may depart from those
guidelines under some circumstances...; and... (3) that the defendant has the right
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refers to a defendant's admission of guilt to a crime. The plea agree-
ment refers to the ultimate agreement reached by the prosecution
and defendant with regard to the punishment and sentencing that
results from the defendant's plea.21 '
The defendant next claimed that a factual basis inquiry protects
against government overreaching. 212 Despite the majority's claims
that such an argument was "unavailing,"213 prosecutorial overreaching
is one of the most significant concerns of criminal forfeiture critics. 214
The Court discussed other procedural safeguards a trial court should
undertake in order to ensure a forfeiture provision is valid,215 and
claimed that these safeguards adequately ensure that the forfeiture
provision is appropriate.
However, these procedures do not address the issue of whether a
factual basis exists for forfeiture of the defendant's assets.216 In addi-
to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, the right to be
tried by a jury and at that trial the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right against compelled self-
incrimination; and (4) that if a plea of guilty... is accepted by the court there will not
be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty.., the defendant waives the
right to a trial....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c). Rule 11 further provides, "The court shall not accept a plea of
guilty... without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining
that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from
the plea agreement...." FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(d).
210 Rule 11(e) provides:
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant
... may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon
the entering of a plea of guilty.., to a charged offense or to a lesser or related
offense, the attorney for the government will do any of the following: (A) move for
dismissal of other charges; or (B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose
the defendant's request, for a particular sentence... ; or (C) agree that a specific
sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case ...
FED. R. GRIM. P. 11 (e).
211 Id.
212 Librett4 116 S. Ct. at 364-65.
213 Id. at 364.
214 The Court hastily dismissed Libretti's argument that the factual basis inquiry of Rule
1 (f) applies to forfeiture in order to prevent government overreaching. This seems odd
in light of the fact that one of the primary reasons that the Court has been hesitant to
grant any government forfeiture without review is to prevent "unchecked government...
[from] excercis[ing] its power by confiscating private property." Richard C. Reuben, One
Crime, Two Punishments: Asset Forfeiture Cases Offer Chance to Sort Out Double Jeopardy Issues, 81
A.BAJ. 38, 38 (1995).
215 The Court noted that the Department of Justice provides standards to ensure the
validity of a forfeiture provision. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 365 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICF,
REvISED PoLIcy REGARDING FORFEITURE BY SE-rLEMENT AND PLEA BARGAINING IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL AGIIONS, DIRECTIVE 94-7 (1994)). These standards include requirements that the
forfeiture settlement be in writing and that the defendant "concede facts supporting the
forfeiture." Id. In addition, the district court "may" accept, but is not required to accept
the parties' agreement to a particular sentence. Id.
216 Unlike other procedural safeguards, the factual basis requirement
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tion, as the defendant stated, these procedural safeguards imposed on
the court do not adequately combat the possibility of prosecutorial
overreaching. 217 The Rule 11 (f) factual basis requirement serves as a
"procedural safeguard to ensure that criminal forfeiture does not ex-
ceed the broad authority of § 853 and confiscate property without leg-
islative authority."218 By the plain language of § 853, a defendant
must only forfeit property derived from or property used to perpetu-
ate a continuing criminal enterprise.2 19 Thus, Libretti argued, al-
lowing a prosecutor to require a defendant to forfeit legitimately
acquired assets is in direct violation of the statute, and results in
prosecutorial overreaching. 220
In his final policy argument Libretti claimed that the factual basis
requirement is essential to protect the rights of innocent third par-
ties.221 According to Libretti, the consequences of failing to protect
third party rights are particularly egregious.222 This is primarily due
to the fact that without the Rule 11 (f) factual basis requirement, inno-
cent third parties do not have adequate procedural safeguards by
which to protect their rights. 223 Although Libretti's argument has
will provide the court with information necessary to ensure that the government has
not exceeded its statutory forfeiture authority... [and] ensure that the defendant
understands the scope of the forfeiture being sought and the facts necessary to sup-
port that forfeiture, and knowingly and voluntarily agrees to the forfeiture under
those conditions.
Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Libretti v. United States at 7, 116 S. Ct. 356 (1995) (No. 94-
7427).
217 Libretti argued that a factual basis requirement would prevent "unlawful" and "unin-
tended" forfeitures. Brief for the Petitioner at 31, Libretti (No. 94-7427). In addition, he
claimed that the factual basis requirement would provide the court with information neces-
sary to ensure that the government has not exceeded its statutory forfeiture authority. Id.
at 31-32.
218 Id. at 27.
219 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994).
220 The district court proceedings in Libretti exemplify this possibility. Libretti notes
that,
[T]he government and the courts below interpreted the plea agreement as working a
forfeiture of petitioner's entire estate without the necessity of showing any factual ba-
sis ... [T]he agreement so construed covers many assets for which forfeiture is not
authorized by section 853, and the district court's postverdict proceedings lend sub-
stantial support to his claims.
Petitioner's Brief at 32, Libretti (No. 94-7427).
221 Libretti, 116 S. CL at 365. Some commentators suggest that perhaps this is the most
critical issue in Libretti. See, e.g., Richard J. Troberman, Double Jeopardy in Forfeiture Law:
Keeping the Defense Bar's Winning Streak Alive 21J. LEGIs. 197, 208-09 (1995). The issue of
third-party rights is critical due to the fact that without the Rule 11 (f) factual basis require-
ment, "the issue of ultimate forfeitability of the property [of third-party claimants] will
never be determined by anybody." Id. (commenting that "[iut will be a fait accompli if the
court is not required-even when there is a guilty plea-to make a factual determination
that the property is actually subject to forfeiture").




some merit, the majority was correct in concluding that § 853(n), 224
not Rule 11(f), provides an adequate means to protect the rights of
innocent third parties.225 As Justice O'Connor accurately stated:
Whatever the merits of this argument as a matter of policy, Congress has
determined that § 853(n), rather than Rule 11 (f), provides the means by
which third-party rights must be vindicated. Third-party claimants are
not party to Rule 11(f) proceedings, and Libretti's assertion that their
interests are best protected therein fits poorly within our adversary sys-
tem of justice.22 6
Perhaps one of the most obvious criticisms of the majority's opin-
ion is that its decision is unnecessary to arrive at the conclusion it
reached. 227 The Court granted certiorari to resolve dispute among
the circuits regarding applicability of Rule 11 (f) to forfeiture provi-
sions in plea agreements.228 The Court claims Rule 11(f) does not
apply to a guilty plea, but then states that if Rule 11 (f) did apply, the
district court established a factual basis for Libretti's forfeiture.2 29
Such an apparently contradictory discussion sends a conflicting
224 If the forfeiture provision erroneously includes the property of innocent third-party
claimants, the innocent third parties can protect their interests by following the proce-
dures set forth in § 853. After entry of a forfeiture order, a person other than the defend-
ant may "petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in
the property. The hearing shall be held before the court alone, without ajury." 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(n) (2) (1994). The petition "shall set forth the nature and extent of the petitioner's
right, tide, or interest in the property, the time and circumstances of the petitioner's acqui-
sition ... any additional facts supporting the petitioner's claim, and the relief sought." Id.
§ 853(n)(3). § 853(n) further provides that:
If... the petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that-(A) the
petitioner has a legal right, tide, or interest in the property, and such right, tide or
interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right,
tide, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior
to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the
acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section; or (B) the
petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the prop-
erty and was at the time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the prop-
erty was subject to forfeiture under this section; the court shall amend the order of
forfeiture in accordance with its determination.
Id. § 853(n) (6).
225 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 365. The burden proposed by § 853(n)(6) is not as heavy as the
defendant suggests. Third parties can prove their interests in forfeited property by satisfy-
ing the preponderance of the evidence standard. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (6). By definition,
this standard merely requires that a third party prove that it is more probable than not that
the property is legally that of the third party, not the defendant. See BLAcK's LAW DiG-noN-
ARv, supra note 203, at 1182.
226 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 365.
227 See Steven Wisotsky, Libretti Decision May Mean Parties Can Achieve by Stipulation That
Which is Otherwise not Authorized by Law, WEsr's LEGAL NEws, May 3, 1996, available at 1996
WL 260506 (1996) (commenting that "it is possible to regard the entire decision as obiter
dictum because on each point the Court's ruling is shown to be unnecessary to the result it
reached").
228 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 362.
229 Id. at 365-67.
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message to the circuit courts, 230 despite the Court's claim that its pur-
pose of granting certiorari was to "resolve disagreement among the
Circuits." 23 1
In his dissent, Justice Stevens properly noted that application of
the Rule 11 (f) factual basis requirement to a forfeiture provision pro-
vides a procedural safeguard to ensure that the law, not a plea agree-
ment between the prosecutor and the defendant, "defines the limits
on the district court's authority to forfeit a defendant's property."23 2
Considering that the very nature of a plea agreement containing a
forfeiture provision results in a reduced sentence for the defendant
and increased financial benefit for the government, it is not incon-
ceivable that both parties may be concerned more about personal
gain than the law. As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent, the major-
ity's opinion could provide wealthy defendants with an opportunity to
plead guilty, agree to forfeit large quantities of assets and receive
favorable plea agreements in the way of reduced prison time, regard-
less of whether such asset were acquired by drug tainted funds.23 3
C. THE COURT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESS THE RULE 31 (E)
SPECIAL VERDICT RIGHT
The Court's Rule 31(e) holding, like its Rule 11(f) holding, fo-
cused primarily on an examination of the plain language of the Rule,
rather than its policy considerations.23 4 Justice O'Connor's opinion
regarding the requisites for a defendant's waiver of his or her Rule
230 The Court's discussion leaves several important questions unanswered: Do trial
courts have to engage in the very factual basis inquiry which the Court stated was unneces-
sary under Rule 11 (f), but engaged in nonetheless? Can a trial court examine the PSR and
conclude that the defendant made a voluntary and informed decision without determining
whether facts of a case warrant a particular forfeiture provision? Does Rule 11 (f) impose a
heightened standard on prosecutors to ensure that a factual basis exists if the court is not
required to conduct a separate review to guarantee that a factual basis of forfeiture exists?
How courts will answer these questions remains to be seen. However, one commentator
suggests that "federal forfeiture policy has changed since the lower courts considered Li-
bret, and now calls for prosecutors to suggest that trial courts find a factual basis for forfeit-
ures." See Reuben, supra note 214, at 38. Although the author states no authority, there is
probably some merit to this statement. For example, even in Librett4 the district court
"determined that ownership of certain items of forfeited property was in dispute." United
States v. Libretti, 38 F.d 523, 526 (10th Cir. 1994). The court therefore intended to con-
duct a hearing to determine which of Libretti's assets were actually "tainted" by criminal
funds, and to examine the prosecutor's claims for substitute assets. Id. However, the gov-
ernment filed and was granted a motion to stay these proceedings pending appeal. Id.
231 Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 362.
232 Id. at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233 Id. at 370-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing this result and stating "[t] he mere
fact the defendant has agreed that an item is forfeitable, in a plea agreement, does not
make it so." (quoting United States v. Roberts, 749 F.2d 404, 409 (7th Cir. 1984))).
23 See Wisotsky, supra note 227, at *1.
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31 (e) right to a jury determination of forfeitability of assets was the
primary source of disagreement among some members of the
Court.23 5 The majority rejected the defendant's argument that he did
not adequately waive his Rule 31 (e) right to a jury determination of
the forfeitability of his assets. 23 6 The Court started its discussion with
the conclusion it reached in the Rule 11(f) factual basis discussion,
specifically that forfeiture is part of the sentence, not a substantive
element of a crime. 23 7
The right to trial by jury is one of the most fundamental constitu-
tional rights afforded to a defendant 23 8 However, through plea bar-
gaining,23 9 a defendant contemplates that the ultimate effect of an
acceptable 240 guilty plea agreement is that the defendant waives his or
her right to ajury determination of guilt or innocence 24' in exchange
for a more favorable sentencing arrangement. In Libretti, the defend-
ant argued that the Rule 31 (e) right to ajury determination of forfei-
ture deserves heightened procedural protection similar to that
provided by the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of
guilt or innocence.242 As Justice O'Connor accurately stated,
Supreme Court precedents show that the Rule 31(e) right does not
fall within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment's protection. 243
235 Justice O'Connor's opinion with respect to Rule 31 (e) was set forth in Part Im of the
Court's opinion. Librett4 116 S. Ct. at 367-69. Justices Souter and Ginsburg filed separate
opinions primarily to discuss faults in the majority's opinion with respect to the Rule 31(e)
special verdict right. Id. at 369 (Souter, J., concurring); Id. at 369-70 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
236 Id. at 367.
237 Id.
238 See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
239 Plea bargaining refers to the off-the-record, out-of-court negotiations between
prosecution and defense for a mutually beneficial trade: the defendant waives all of
his rights to trial by jury, the right not to incriminate himself by pleading guilty, and
the right to cross-examine witesses against him; he pleads guilty in exchange for a
more lenient sentence for reduced charges. The prosecutor avoids the many
problems inherent in a trial, saves the public a lot of time and money, and disposes of
the case with another conviction notched on his record.
Lai, supra note 3, at 196-97.
240 Rule 11 (e) (3) makes the disposition of thejudgment and sentence of the plea agree-
ment contingent upon acceptance of the agreement by the court. FED. R. CiuM. P.
1 (e) (3).
241 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (noting that when a criminal
defendant pleads guilty, the defendant waives the right to trial byjury). Libretti acknowl-
edged that by pleading guilty to the CCE count, he waived his right to trial byjury. Librett4
116 S. Ct. at 368.
242 Brief for the Petitioner at 45, Libretli (No. 94-7427).
243 Librett 116 S. Ct. at 368 ("Our cases have made abundantly clear that a defendant
does not enjoy a constitutional right to ajury determination as to the appropriate sentence
to be imposed.") (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) ("[T]here is no
Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific find-
ings of fact.")).
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To support the claim that the trial court erred in holding that
Libretti's waiver was adequate, the defendant also focused on the im-
portance of the jury in ensuring that a defendant's forfeiture is legally
permissible. 244 In support of his position, the defendant argued that
the "Sixth Amendment guarantees ajury trial in cases where that safe-
guard would have been available at common law."245 The defendant
further argued that at common law, juries "served as a safeguard
against ... governmental oppression" that resulted from the "poten-
tial for raising enormous revenues by forfeiture."246 The defendant
correctly argued that the Court went too far in distinguishing the Rule
31 (e) jury trial right from the jury trial right provided by the Sixth
Amendment.247 In essence, the purpose of both procedural safe-
guards is to ensure that the entire judicial process is "fair" to the de-
fendant (i.e. protection of defendants' rights relative to the court,
prosecution and/or govemment).248 As does the Rule 11 (f) factual
basis requirement, the Rule 31 (e) special verdict requirement serves
as a means of preventing prosecutorial overreaching and ensuring
that a judge is not "compliant" or "biased."24 9 Justice Souter claimed
that since the defendant had a copy of and heard and read the indict-
ment, "he will naturally understand that his right to jury trial covers a
verdict on the forfeiture claim."2 50 Whether or not a defendant will
"naturally understand" this right is debatable. This uncertainty is par-
ticularly apparent where the court conveying the Rule 31 (e) jury trial
information to the defendant does so in such a way that the court
unintentionally misleads or confuses the defendant.251
In contrast, however, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the Rule
31 (e) jury trial right "must be known in order to be given up volunta-
rily."252 Nonetheless, Justice Ginsburg concluded that although the
trial court did not inform Libretti of his Rule 31 (e) right at trial, the
court's reference to the special verdict right on two pretrial occasions
244 Petitioner's Brief at 45, Libretti (No. 94-7427).
245 Id.
246 Id. at 44.
247 See id. at 44-45.
248 See id.
249 Id. at 44 ("The purpose of the right to trial by jury is 'to prevent oppression by the
Government' and to provide a 'safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.'") (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968)).
250 United States v. Libretti, 116 S. Ct. 356, 369 (1995) (SouterJ., concurring).
251 The court informed Libretti that "if you plead guilty... the jury is not going to
decide whether you're guilty or not." See id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter noted
that "there is some reason to argue that the court's colloquy with the defendant. . . was
misleading." Id.
252 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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barred Libretti from "plead[ing] ignorance" of the Rule 31 (e) right to
ajury trial.25 Justice O'Connor failed to explain why she was hesitant
to require, as opposed to permit, a court to specifically inform a de-
fendant of his or her Rule 31 (e) jury right. Imposing such a require-
ment is not unduly burdensome.2 54 Indeed, the benefits of requiring
a trial court to ensure that the defendant understands this right out-
weigh the burdens of requiring a court to take steps to inform the
defendant.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Libretti, the Supreme Court properly concluded that Rule I 1 (f)
does not require a court to determine whether a factual basis exists for
a forfeiture provision in a guilty plea. However, by focusing primarily
on a technical examination of the plain language, and interpretation
of court precedents, the Court failed to adequately address the policy
considerations of forfeiture provisions. In addition, the Court missed
an important opportunity to encourage lower courts to use the Rule
11(f) factual basis requirement as a means of preventing potential
abuse of the criminal forfeiture and plea agreement procedures. In
light of the importance of both criminal forfeiture and the plea pro-
cess, the Court should have taken the approach advocated by Justice
Stevens and "emphasize[d] the underlying proposition that the law-
rather than any agreement between the parties-defines the limits on
the district court's authority to forfeit a defendant's property."255
Similarly, the Court properly concluded that the procedural
rights and protections provided by the Rule 31 (e) special verdict right
are not equivalent to those provided by the Sixth Amendment. Thus,
a defendant does not have the same procedural rights to a Rule 31 (e)
jury determination of forfeiture as he or she has to ajury determina-
tion of guilt or innocence. The Court nonetheless failed to recognize
that Rule 31 (e) and the Sixth Amendment are both necessary and
important means of protecting the rights of defendants in criminal
forfeiture cases.
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253 Id. at 369-70 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
254 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals engaged in such an analysis when it determined
that the trial court established facts sufficient to have apprised the defendant of that right.
See Wisotsky, supra note 227, at *3.
255 Libretti, 116 S. Ct at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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